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MANDATE FOR U.S. HOUSE ELECTIONS ON POLITICAL
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INTRODUCTION
In 1967, in the wake of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA),
Congress enacted a law requiring every state to elect its representa-
tives to the U.S. House of Representatives in single-member
districts.1 Congress’s mandate was based on a well-founded fear
that, in response to the VRA’s success in combating discriminatory
voting laws, states would adopt multimember congressional districts
with winner-take-all voting in an attempt to keep black candidates
from winning representation.2 In the years after the law was passed,
single-member districts—combined with the success of the VRA—
increased the number of black candidates elected to the U.S. House,3
and paved the way for the use of majority-minority voting districts
to ensure communities of color could elect a candidate of their
choice.4 However, more than fifty years later, Congress’s single-
member districting scheme for U.S. House elections has had
unintended and far-reaching consequences for America’s national
political health.5 Furthermore, modern analysis reveals that single-
member districts, in the context of twenty-first century technology
and geographical trends, poorly deliver on Congress’s original goal
of ensuring fair representation of communities of color.6 As a result,
Congress has reached peak levels of dysfunction and partisan
gridlock, and the composition of Congress lags behind the growing
diversity of the American electorate.7
To spur desperately needed reform of America’s U.S. House
elections, this Note challenges the constitutionality of Congress’s
1. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2012) (“Representatives shall be elected only from districts so
established, no district to elect more than one Representative.”).
2. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. See infra Part III.C.
7. Kristen Bialik & Jens Manuel Krogstad, 115th Congress Sets New High for Racial,
Ethnic Diversity, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/
01/24/115th-congress-sets-new-high-for-racial-ethnic-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/QVW2-
PEXW] (“Despite the increase in nonwhite representation in Congress, whites account for 81%
of the current Congress but represent just 62% of the population. This gap has widened over
time.”).
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single-member district mandate, arguing that the law violates
voters’ First Amendment political association rights. Single-member
districts, which result in winner-take-all8 elections to fill all 435
seats in the U.S. House, effectively preserve a two-party system.
With only one winner in each district, and only one vote to cast for
each voter, elections naturally devolve into a two-candidate horse
race.9 The result is that, in the 115th Congress, every member of the
U.S. House belonged to one of the two major parties,10 leaving
minor-party voters and those dissatisfied with major-party policy
positions with the unenviable choice of voting their conscience—and
in all likelihood, wasting their vote—or holding their noses and
voting for one of the two major parties.
Relying on the analytical framework provided by the Anderson-
Burdick standard,11 this Note applies the Court’s jurisprudence on
political association rights to Congress’s mandate of single-member
districts. The Anderson-Burdick standard requires courts to eval-
uate the burden an election law imposes on voters’ political asso-
ciation rights, and weighs that burden against the government’s
legitimate interests advanced by the law in question.12 Although the
Anderson-Burdick standard was developed through the Supreme
Court’s evaluation of state election laws, this Note takes the position
that the standard represents the most logical approach to evaluat-
ing a First Amendment political association challenge to an Act of
Congress.
Part I documents the history precipitating Congress’s single-
member district mandate and the troubling impact the mandate has
had on America’s political health. Part II describes the Court’s
development of the Anderson-Burdick standard as a means to
8. FairVote, a nonpartisan election reform organization, defines “winner-take-all” as “[a]
voting system used in which the candidate with the most votes wins, and supporters of all
other candidates receive no representation.” FAIRVOTE, MONOPOLY POLITICS 2018: THE ROOT
OF DYSFUNCTION IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 6 (2017), https://www.fairvote.org/
monopoly_politics_report_2018 [https://perma.cc/YX5N-7S9R] [hereinafter MONOPOLY POLI-
TICS 2018].
9. MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE
MODERN STATE 217 (Barbara & Robert North trans., John Wiley & Sons 2d ed. 1963) (1951).
10. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMBERSHIP OF THE 115TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1 (2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44762.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWU5-NMM8].
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.A.
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evaluate state election laws burdening voters’ political association
rights and examines the Court’s recent decision to vacate a district
court’s analysis of partisan gerrymandering through the lens of
political association rights. Part III articulates the burden single-
member districts impose on voters and weighs that burden against
Congress’s original legitimate interest in ensuring representation
for black voters in the U.S. House. Part IV anticipates and ad-
dresses potential institutional concerns about the Supreme Court
weighing in on Congress’s chosen method of political representation.
I. CONGRESS’S MANDATE: GOOD INTENTIONS AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
Part I first explores Congress’s important reason for mandating
single-member districts in the wake of the Voting Rights Act. It then
examines the collateral consequences of using single-member
districts to elect the U.S. House and illustrates how the current
system has paved the road to the partisan polarization and gridlock
that permeates American politics today.
A. An Extension of the Voting Rights Act
Congress passed its single-member district mandate for U.S.
House elections in 1967, on the heels of the VRA of 1965.13 The VRA
resulted in a massive surge of newly registered black voters in
southern states, where invidious laws had, up to that point, severely
disenfranchised black citizens.14 In response to the success of the
VRA, southern states began to adopt multimember districts with
winner-take-all voting in state and local elections in an attempt to
keep black candidates from winning representation.15 In practice,
13. Andrew Spencer, Christopher Hughes & Rob Richie, Escaping the Thicket: The Ranked
Choice Voting Solution to America’s Districting Crisis, 46 CUMB. L. REV. 377, 378 (2015-16).
14. See ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS
IN AMERICA 39-48 (2015) (“The 302,000 African-Americans who had registered under the
[VRA] in the past year would have their rights protected, and millions more would get an
opportunity to exercise their most fundamental right.”).
15. See, e.g., id. at 56 (“[Mississippi] denied black voters representation in the state
legislature by creating large, multi-member state legislative districts in which black voting
strength was diluted.”).
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this meant states would draw districts large enough to ensure that
white voters constituted a majority, and then hold at-large, winner-
take-all elections for all the seats in the district.16 Assuming the
white majority voted as a group, black voters would be locked out of
representation regardless of how many seats were up for election.17
Congress feared that states would apply this discriminatory tactic
to congressional elections, and, in 1967, passed a federal mandate
that each state elect its U.S. House representatives from single-
member districts to combat state attempts at diluting black votes.18
The immediate impact of the law, combined with the powerful
enfranchising effect of the VRA, was undeniable: in just five election
cycles after single-member districts were mandated, the number of
black congressmembers elected to the U.S. House tripled from five
to fifteen.19 Furthermore, since Congress passed its mandate, single-
member districts have become a crude—albeit straightforward—
means of remedying vote dilution20 cases brought under section 2 of
the VRA.21 A typical remedy in such cases is to require a state or
locality to draw, where possible, districts in which a racial minority
community comprises a majority of the electorate and is thus able
to elect a candidate of its choice.22 In Thornburg v. Gingles, a
landmark vote dilution case, the Supreme Court went as far as
16. Note, Racial Vote Dilution in Multimember Districts: The Constitutional Standard
After Washington v. Davis, 76 MICH. L. REV. 694, 695 (1978).
17. Spencer, Hughes & Richie, supra note 13, at 378 (“[S]ome states and localities
threatened to shift from denying votes of racial minorities to diluting them with racially
gerrymandered districts or winner-take-all at-large elections.”).
18. Id.
19. Vital Statistics on Congress, BROOKINGS INST. (May 21, 2018), https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch1_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/S565-
A678].
20. Vote dilution is the practice of impeding a group of racial minority voters from
“convert[ing] their voting strength into the control of, or at least influence with, elected public
officials.” Richard L. Engstrom, Racial Vote Dilution: The Concept and the Court, in THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 13, 14 (Lorn S. Foster ed., 1985).
21. See Spencer, Hughes & Richie, supra note 13, at 384-85. Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act prohibits voting practices that discriminate against racial, ethnic, or language minority
voters, regardless of intent. 52 U.S.C. § 10303 (2012).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Osceola County, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (M.D. Fla. 2006)
(holding that the county’s at-large, bloc voting system violated section 2 of the VRA by
preventing a Hispanic candidate from being elected despite Hispanic voters forming a
politically cohesive minority voting group, and subsequently ordering a plan providing for a
district in which Hispanic citizens constituted a majority of eligible voters).
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stating that “single-member district[s] [are] generally the appropri-
ate standard against which to measure minority group potential to
elect.”23
As long as a group of voters is numerous and compact enough to
comprise a majority in a district, Congress’s mandate gives district
mapmakers a tool to ensure that racial minority communities are
able to elect a candidate of their choice to the U.S. House.24 How-
ever, more than fifty years of experience since Congress’s mandate
has revealed troubling shortcomings when using these districts as
a proxy for representation of a voting group’s interests.25 Part III of
this Note will further explore the limitations of majority-minority
districts, and point to alternatives to single-member districts as a
better means of providing racial minority communities with repre-
sentation and political power in the U.S. House.26
B. Paving the Road to Political Dysfunction
When Congress passed its single-member district mandate in
1967, it could not anticipate the collateral impact of its chosen
electoral structure on American politics over the course of the next
few decades. The American political experience since the 1970s dem-
onstrates that single-member districts are a driving factor of two
interrelated and fundamental problems in U.S. House elections:
plummeting levels of electoral competition and fierce partisan
polarization.
Competition has rapidly dwindled in U.S. House elections over
the past few decades. In 1992, for example, 134 House districts were
within 3 percentage points of being a fifty-fifty partisanship dis-
trict; however, in the 2016 election, that number dropped to just 23
of the 435 House districts.27 This trend is the product of Congress’s
single-member district system, combined with hardening partisan-
ship over the past few decades.28 Not only has partisanship grown
23. 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.17 (1986).
24. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 163-72 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part III.C.
27. MONOPOLY POLITICS 2018, supra note 8, at 38.
28. E.g., Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander & Matthew Gunning, Incumbency,
Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. POL. 75, 80 (2006)
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stronger among voters, but it has done so along geographic lines.29
Therefore, when only one person is elected to represent a district,
partisan and geographic realities make it very hard to draw
consistently competitive districts.30 FairVote, a nonpartisan election
reform organization, argues that “hardening partisanship has a
wide range of negative effects in the context of our current winner-
take-all, single-winner district system of elections,” including “a
staggering lack of competition that leaves millions of Americans
without any hope of winning representation” or having a represen-
tative who feels compelled to listen to them.31 Moreover, easily
manipulated single-member districts exacerbate the effectiveness
of partisan gerrymandering,32 in which opposing-party voters are
packed into as few districts as possible to gain an electoral advan-
tage for the party drawing the maps, further hindering com-
petition.33
This increasing lack of competition under the current single-
member district regime further fuels the partisan polarization af-
flicting American political discourse. As districts become safer for
the partisans elected in them, the incentives for reaching across the
aisle rapidly diminish, and the only threat to reelection comes from
(explaining declining competition in U.S. House districts “[a]s a result of both increased
partisan polarization and increased partisan consistency in voting behavior”).
29. Lee Drutman, This Voting Reform Solves 2 of America’s Biggest Political Problems,
VOX (July 26, 2017, 3:21 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/4/26/15425492/propor
tional-voting-polarization-urban-rural-third-parties [https://perma.cc/B3W9-TFST] (“The
hardening of partisan lines has strong geographical implications. That’s because urban ar-
eas—and, increasingly, suburban areas—tend to vote Democratic while exurban places tend
to vote Republican.”).
30. Id. (“[A]s long as we have single-member districts, and as long as Democrats
concentrate in cities while Republicans live outside of the cities, any attempt to redraw
districts to make them competitive would require awkwardly connecting slices of city to far-
flung patches of country in ways that look even stranger and uglier than the current
gerrymanders.”).
31. MONOPOLY POLITICS 2018, supra note 8, at 29.
32. The Supreme Court defined the term “partisan gerrymandering [as] the drawing of
legislative district lines to subordinate adherents of one political party and entrench a rival
party in power.” Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2658 (2015).
33. See Spencer, Hughes & Richie, supra note 13, at 379-80 (arguing that gerrymandering
“is an inevitable consequence of any single-winner district system,” and that multimember
districts with proportional voting methods are the best way to combat partisan gerry-
mandering).
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challengers in partisan primary elections.34 Lee Drutman, in
advocating for Congress to abandon single-member districts to
restore civility to American politics, notes that “[t]here are few
rewards for [politicians in safe districts] to depart from party group-
think to work with the other side to broker deals, and lots of
punishments should they try.”35 
The incentive structures created by Congress’s current winner-
take-all, single-member district scheme have resulted in crippling
legislative gridlock and dysfunction.36 According to Professor
Samuel Issacharoff, “the total enacted legislation annually by the
U.S. Congress has declined considerably from the 1970s.”37 During
the 1970s, just after the adoption of single-member districts, the
95th Congress passed “as many as 804 bills,” whereas the 114th
Congress passed “only 329 bills.”38 Ideological polarization is at its
worst in the U.S. House. “DW-NOMINATE” scores, a means of
representing legislators’ voting records on a spatial map, show that
the U.S. House of Representatives was recently the most ideologi-
cally polarized it has ever been since researchers began tracking
such things just before 1880.39
While there may be other contributing factors for declining com-
petition and bipartisanship in America, single-member districts
bear significant responsibility for the current state of affairs on
Capitol Hill. In light of a half-century worth of evidence as to the
collateral consequences of Congress’s mandate, and for the constitu-
tional reasons soon to be articulated, the nation’s current single-
member district regime must be replaced. This Note argues that to
spur necessary change, voters must look to the courts and challenge
Congress’s mandate on constitutional grounds. Only then will
Members of Congress be forced to abandon an electoral system that
34. Drutman, supra note 29 (arguing that politicians from safe U.S. House districts must
only worry about “the remote chance that they might get primaried, a lingering threat that
keeps them from doing anything that would upset their party’s base voters”).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Democracy’s Deficits, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 485, 499 (2018)
(“[I]n the modern era, the words ‘Congress’ and ‘dysfunction’ seem to go together like a horse
and carriage.”).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Jeff Lewis, Polarization in Congress, VOTEVIEW (Aug. 14, 2019), https://voteview.
com/articles/party_polarization [https://perma.cc/P2HL-S37R].
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has paved the road to political dysfunction and voter frustration,
and reimagine a more representative and responsive system for
electing “the People’s House.” This Note provides a roadmap for
such a challenge under the First Amendment. 
II. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING BURDENS ON
VOTERS’ POLITICAL ASSOCIATION RIGHTS
To challenge the constitutionality of Congress’s single-member
district mandate in U.S. House elections, this Note argues that
single-member districts violate voters’ First Amendment political
association rights. In order to evaluate state election laws that
burden association rights, the Supreme Court developed a balanc-
ing test known as the “Anderson-Burdick” standard.40 Part II
explores the history and development of this standard, and then
considers the Court’s recent decision to vacate a district court’s
analysis of partisan gerrymandering through the lens of political
association rights.
It is important to note that the Anderson-Burdick standard was
developed through the Court’s evaluation of state laws and has not
historically been used beyond such contexts. The law this Note
addresses, however, is an Act of Congress enacted pursuant to its
enumerated power to regulate the time, place, and manner of
elections for the U.S. Senate and House.41 Even so, Congress’s
single-member district mandate for U.S. House elections is subject
to the constraints of the Constitution, like any law.42 Because the
Anderson-Burdick standard represents a robust and well-developed
standard used by the Supreme Court to evaluate First Amendment
political association challenges to state election laws, this Note uses
the standard as a framework to evaluate Congress’s single-member
district mandate.
40. See infra Part II.A.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
42. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (holding section 4(b) of the
VRA unconstitutional because it infringed upon the constitutional sovereignty of the states).
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A. Developing a Standard
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with respect to voters’
political association rights under the First Amendment began with
its decision in Williams v. Rhodes in 1968.43 Ohio passed a series of
election laws that made it harder for new parties to gain access to
the state’s ballot for choosing presidential electors.44 The most
notable of these laws was a requirement that new political parties
obtain petition signatures from at least 15 percent of the number of
ballots cast in the last gubernatorial election.45 The practical impact
of the new law was that it was “virtually impossible for any party to
qualify on the ballot except the Republican and Democratic
Parties.”46 The Independent Party challenged the laws on an equal
protection basis.47 However, the Court articulated two rights of
voters that “overlapp[ed],” stating that the voters’ right “to associate
for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right ... regardless
of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively,” were
burdened by the state’s new laws.48
In an opinion by Justice Hugo Black, the Court held that Ohio’s
laws, in their totality, imposed an unconstitutional “burden on
voting and associational rights,” violating the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.49 The Court reasoned that the laws effectively gave
the two major parties “a complete monopoly” on representation,
stifling “[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental policies,” which go
to “the core of our ... First Amendment freedoms.”50 Although other
decisions had established political association rights protected by
the Constitution,51 Williams was trailblazing in that it established
43. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
44. Id. at 24.
45. Id. at 24-25.
46. Id. at 25.
47. Id. at 27.
48. Id. at 30.
49. Id. at 34.
50. Id. at 32.
51. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (holding that the Constitution
protects one’s “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas”).
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access to the ballot as an important means of political association
for voters.52
Williams was followed by Kusper v. Pontikes in 1973, in which the
Court struck down an Illinois law prohibiting individuals from
voting in a political party’s primary election if they had voted in
another party’s primary in the preceding twenty-three months.53
The Court again invoked the First and Fourteenth Amendments in
holding that the law “substantially restrict[ed] voter[s’] freedom to
change [their] political party affiliation” and burdened voters’
participation in primary elections.54
These cases paved the way for the Court’s decision in Anderson v.
Celebrezze, in which a constitutional standard began to emerge for
evaluating burdens on ballot access.55 In Anderson, independent
presidential candidate John Anderson challenged Ohio’s early fil-
ing deadline for independent candidates, arguing the law was “an
unconstitutional burden on the voting and associational rights of
[his] supporters.”56 The Court agreed that the law imposed a burden
that fell “unequally on ... independent candidates,” and in doing so,
“impinge[d], by its very nature, on associational choices protected by
the First Amendment,”57 characterizing the burden as “a significant
state-imposed restriction.”58
Such a finding, however, did not complete the Court’s analysis.
The Court acknowledged that Ohio might justify placing burdens
on voters’ associational rights by demonstrating a legitimate state
interest served by the law in question,59 citing its decision in Storer
v. Brown.60 The State asserted three distinct interests in passing
the law: “voter education, equal treatment for [major-party] and
52. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Gerrymandering and Association, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2159,
2183 (2018).
53. 414 U.S. 51, 52-53 (1973).
54. Id. at 57.
55. 460 U.S. 780 (1983); see Tokaji, supra note 52, at 2184.
56. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782.
57. Id. at 793-94.
58. Id. at 795.
59. Id. at 802-03.
60. 415 U.S. 724 (1974). In Storer, the Court upheld, among a few other restrictive
provisions, a California law restricting independent candidates’ access to the general election
ballot when that candidate had been defeated in a political party’s primary that year, or had
been registered with a political party within the preceding year. Id. at 726, 736.
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independent candidates alike, and political stability.”61 The Court—
while recognizing all three of the State’s interests as legitimate—
discarded the first two interests easily, finding no evidence that the
law in question actually furthered those goals.62
As for the latter, the Court found that Ohio’s interest in promot-
ing political stability in a nationwide presidential election was not
nearly as strong as California’s interest in avoiding political
fragmentation within its own state boundaries in Storer.63 In a 5-4
opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court found that Ohio’s
“interest in protecting political stability” writ large could not justify
the burden on Anderson’s supporters’ associational rights.64
Furthermore, the Court reiterated a guiding principle from Kusper,
maintaining that when a “[s]tate has open to it a less drastic way of
satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative
scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal
liberties.”65
In 1992, the Court refined the standard it set forth in Anderson
when it upheld Hawaii’s ban on write-in voting in Burdick v.
Takushi.66 In upholding Hawaii’s law, the Court characterized the
ban as “only a limited burden on voters’ rights to make free choices
and to associate politically through the vote.”67 The majority, led by
Justice White, reasoned that because Hawaii provided for easy
access to the ballot until two months before the State’s primary
election, any burden on voters’ freedom to associate was “borne only
by those who fail[ed] to identify their candidate of choice until days
before the primary [election].”68
The Court’s characterization of the ban as a “reasonable” burden
was a stark contrast from its characterization of the Ohio law in
Anderson as “a significant state-imposed restriction.”69 These dif-
fering characterizations of the burden imposed on voters made all
61. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796.
62. Id. at 796-801.
63. Id. at 804.
64. Id. at 805-06.
65. Id. at 806 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973)).
66. 504 U.S. 428, 441-42 (1992); Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting Is Association, 43 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 763, 777 (2016).
67. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439.
68. Id. at 436-37.
69. Compare id. at 440, with Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795.
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the difference in the Court’s analysis, as the characterizations
functionally determined the level of scrutiny that the state’s
restriction received.70 As Professor Daniel P. Tokaji, who has written
extensively about the Court’s political association jurisprudence as
applied to voting rights, succinctly summarized, “Burdick reaffirmed
Anderson’s ‘flexible standard,’ while clarifying that strict scrutiny
applies only if the challenged law imposes a ‘severe’ burden on
association or voting.”71 Since Hawaii’s ban on write-in voting im-
posed only a “slight” burden, according to the majority, the Court
gave the state more deference in pursuit of its legitimate interest in
avoiding factionalism in state politics.72 From the Court’s analysis
in Burdick and its distinguishing from Anderson, the Anderson-
Burdick standard emerged.73
B. Addressing America’s Districting Crisis Through a Political
Association Rights Lens
Thus far, this Part has focused on the Court’s application of this
balancing test with respect to ballot access for minor political
parties, as that issue has served as the impetus for the Court’s de-
velopment of a workable standard for evaluating state election laws.
In the last two decades, however, members of the Court have
invoked the First Amendment in dealing with other “voting as
association” issues such as photo identification laws,74 primary
election structures,75 and, most salient for the purposes of this Note,
partisan redistricting.76
70. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
71. Tokaji, supra note 52, at 2188.
72. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439.
73. See Tokaji, supra note 52, at 2188.
74. See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203-04 (2008) (holding that
an Indiana law requiring voters to present a photo identification “impose[d] only a limited
burden on voters[ ]” and that the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud carried the day
(internal quotations omitted)).
75. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 570, 577, 586 (2000) (holding that
the state’s adoption of a “blanket primary” system in which every candidate was listed on each
voter’s primary ballot regardless of party affiliation, violated the political associational rights
of members of the Democratic Party).
76. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1938 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring); Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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For some time, there was hope that using an analytical frame-
work grounded in voters’ political association rights would provide
the courts with a long-sought-after standard to strike down partisan
gerrymanders. In Vieth v. Jubelirer, a case in which the Court began
grappling with the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering,
Justice Anthony Kennedy invoked the First Amendment in a con-
currence.77 Although the Anderson-Burdick standard was not used
to decide the case, Justice Kennedy suggested that a better lens
through which to view potentially unconstitutional partisan re-
districting was by viewing suspect maps as a potential violation of
voters’ First Amendment political association rights.78 In Justice
Kennedy’s view, “First Amendment concerns arise where an appor-
tionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters’
representational rights.”79 Where district lines “had the purpose and
effect of imposing burdens on a disfavored party and its voters, the
First Amendment may offer a sounder and more prudential basis for
intervention than does the Equal Protection Clause.”80
Members of the Court next alluded to political association rights
with respect to districting in a concurring opinion in Gill v.
Whitford.81 Once again, the case did not turn on the First Amend-
ment.82 However, in a concurring opinion authored by Justice Elena
Kagan, a group of four Justices once again suggested that the First
Amendment likely provided a better starting point for plaintiffs
making a constitutional argument against the burdens of partisan
77. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306, 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The plurality in the case
affirmed the district court’s decision on the grounds that there were no “judicially enforceable”
limits on partisan gerrymandering, and that the case was therefore nonjusticiable under the
Court’s political question doctrine. Id. at 305-06 (plurality opinion).
78. See id. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 315.
81. 138 S. Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring).
82. A five-member majority held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the district
map drawn by the Wisconsin state legislature burdened their individual votes, and thus
lacked Article III standing. Id. at 1933 (majority opinion) (holding that the plaintiff’s efficiency
gap calculations were “an average measure” demonstrating a burden on Democratic voters
statewide, but that such calculations “[did] not address the effect that a gerrymander has on
the votes of particular citizens”). The plaintiffs brought their claim under both the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, but the vast majority of their evidence and argument was based on
an allegation of vote dilution in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 1923-24.
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gerrymandering.83 Justice Kagan noted that the standing analysis
for a First Amendment political “association[ ] claim would occasion
a different standing inquiry than the one in the Court’s [majority]
opinion.”84 Citing Justice Kennedy in Vieth, Justice Kagan argued
that when a group of voters’ representational rights are burdened,
the harm they face may be more nuanced than the mathematically
supported claims of vote dilution under the Equal Protection
Clause.85 Voters “deprived of their natural political strength by a
partisan gerrymander, may face difficulties fundraising, registering
voters, attracting volunteers, generating support from independ-
ents, and recruiting candidates to run for office (not to mention
eventually accomplishing their policy objectives).”86
However, hope that the First Amendment framework alluded to
in Vieth and Gill would ultimately be applied to partisan gerryman-
ders vanished in 2019, when a five-member majority of the Court in
Rucho v. Common Cause decided that constitutional challenges to
district maps drawn to favor a single party were “political questions
beyond the reach of the federal courts.”87 Rucho arose on appeal
from the Middle District of North Carolina, where the district court
held that North Carolina’s congressional districts made it so unlike-
ly for Democratic candidates to prevail that “voters affiliated with
the North Carolina Democratic Party” had their associational rights
“chilled.”88 Citing Anderson, the district court held that this chilling
effect—manifesting itself in the form of difficulty in generating voter
turnout, attracting candidates, and raising money— “represent[ed]
cognizable, and recognized, burdens on First Amendment rights.”89
In vacating the decision below, Chief Justice John Roberts read
the district court’s decision to mean that “any level of partisanship
in districting” should be regarded as discrimination against mem-
bers of the opposing party.90 According to Chief Justice Roberts,
83. See id. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[P]artisan gerrymanders may infringe the
First Amendment rights of association held by parties, other political organizations, and their
members.”).
84. Id.
85. Id. 
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2490-91, 2506-07 (2019).
88. Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 931 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
89. Id. at 932.
90. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2504, 2508.
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such a holding would demand that courts arbitrarily—and there-
fore, unconstitutionally—draw difficult lines as to “when partisan
activity goes too far,” essentially choosing partisan winners and
losers.91
As vehemently as one might disagree with the Court’s decision to
abdicate its role in adjudicating partisan power grabs in district
mapmaking,92 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion does well to highlight
the conundrum that winner-take-all, single-member districts pose
for mapmakers and courts alike. Single-member districts are unique
in that they force even the most well-intentioned district mapmaker
to make difficult decisions about which measures of “fairness” to
prioritize at the expense of others.93 Courts could demand that
states prioritize competition, but doing so would likely threaten to
create wildly disproportionate partisan outcomes.94 Similarly,
prioritizing “traditional districting criteria” like maintaining polit-
ical boundaries or keeping communities of interest together may be
a facially benign approach, but geographic realities— namely, the
urban-rural divide among Democrats and Republicans—would
likely result in elections that are just as utterly devoid of competi-
tion as America’s current gerrymandered reality.95
The crux of the problem is that as long as courts or mapmakers
are working within the confines of single-winner districts, they will
always be sacrificing one measure of fairness for another. And, as
91. Id. at 2504.
92. This author agrees with Justice Kagan that partisan gerrymandering is “anti-
democratic in the most profound sense,” and that the majority in Rucho abandoned its role
in defending the nation’s democratic “foundations.” Id. at 2525 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 2500 (majority opinion) (“The initial difficulty in settling on a ‘clear,
manageable and politically neutral’ test for fairness is that it is not even clear what fairness
looks like in this context. There is a large measure of ‘unfairness’ in any winner-take-all
system.”); see also Austin Plier, Late-Night TV Tackles Gerrymandering: John Oliver Leaves
Viewers with Glimmer of Hope but Ignores Solution, SALON (Apr. 14, 2017, 2:58 AM),
https://www.salon.com/2017/04/13/late-night-tackles-gerrymandering-john-oliver-leaves-
viewers-with-glimmer-of-hope-but-ignores-solution_partner [https://perma.cc/54DM-QA9M]
(“In real life, independent commissions can strive for competition, but geographic realities
often force them to sacrifice one value (competition) to ensure another (fair partisan
outcomes).”).
94. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500 (“[M]aking as many districts as possible more com-
petitive could be a recipe for disaster for the disadvantaged party.”).
95. Id. at 2500-01 (noting that even if the Court mandated “‘traditional’ districting
criteria,” the political and geographic reality “of a State ... can itself lead to inherently packed
districts”).
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Chief Justice Roberts demonstrated, the Court is loath to choose
among these measures of fairness—particularly when plaintiffs ask
the Court’s remedy to predict and assign partisan outcomes.96
Instead, the Court relegated itself to the sidelines of the “districting
wars” in the faint hope that self-interested Congressmembers will
come together to fix fundamental flaws in an electoral system that
insulates most members from general election competition.97
This Note argues that plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge is
better directed elsewhere. Rather than challenge gerrymandered
district lines and force the Court “to reallocate political power be-
tween the two major political parties,”98 the best path out of the na-
tion’s districting quandary is to challenge the constitutionality of
Congress’s mandate of single-member districts themselves. Part III
uses the Court’s well-developed Anderson-Burdick standard as an
analytical framework to challenge the constitutionality of single-
member districts on political association grounds.99
III. USING THE ANDERSON-BURDICK FRAMEWORK TO CHALLENGE
SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS ON POLITICAL ASSOCIATION GROUNDS
At its core, the Anderson-Burdick standard weighs the burden
that a law imposes on voters’ political association rights against the
government’s pursuit of legitimate interests.100 Courts are to ex-
amine “the character and magnitude of the asserted [associational]
injury,” and determine the degree to which voters are burdened by
a challenged restriction.101 If the burden on voters is “slight,”102
“reasonable,” and “non-discriminatory,” then Congress’s legitimate
interests are “generally sufficient to justify ... restrictions.”103
96. Id. at 2499 (“Our cases ... clearly foreclose any claim that ... legislatures in re-
apportioning must draw district lines to come as near as possible to allocating seats ... in
proportion to what their anticipated statewide vote will be.”).
97. See id. at 2508 (highlighting proposals in Congress meant to address partisan
gerrymandering, and noting that “the avenue for reform established by the Framers, and used
by Congress in the past, remains open”).
98. Id. at 2507.
99. See infra Part III.
100. See Tokaji, supra note 52, at 2189-90.
101. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
102. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992).
103. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
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However, “significant”104 or “severe” burdens on association receive
strict scrutiny, and such restrictions “must be narrowly drawn to
advance a state interest of compelling importance.”105 If Congress
has “a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests,” it
cannot choose a means which “broadly stifles” voters’ association
rights.106 This Note does not, per se, assert that the Anderson-
Burdick standard must be applied should the Court evaluate
Congress’s single-member district mandate. However, the standard
provides a useful analytical frame for weighing the interests at
issue.
Part III evaluates the character and magnitude of the burden
single-member districts impose on voters in U.S. House elections. In
light of the jurisprudence described above, this Part argues that the
burden on voters’ political association rights is severe enough to
warrant strict scrutiny under the Anderson-Burdick standard.
Furthermore, this Part argues that Congress’s legitimate interest
in adopting single-member districts is poorly served by its mandate.
With more effective alternatives to single-member districts at
Congress’s disposal that do not “broadly stifle” voters’ rights, its
mandate cannot survive strict scrutiny.107
A. The Character and Magnitude of the Burden
There has long been a broad consensus that the single-member
district is among the most powerful and defining of electoral forces
in American politics. French political scientist Maurice Duverger
first posited his now famous “Duverger’s Theory” in 1951, which
states that first-past-the-post voting108 in single-member districts is
the primary driving force preserving the two-party system.109
104. Id. at 795.
105. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
106. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973)).
107. See id.
108. First-past-the-post voting (also known as “plurality voting”) is a voting “system in
which the candidate with the most votes wins without necessarily a majority of votes.”
FAIRVOTE, Electoral Systems 101, https://www.fairvote.org/research_electoralsystems101
[https://perma.cc/FME5-7JPD].
109. See DUVERGER, supra note 9, at 217, 226 (“[T]he simple-majority single-ballot system
favours the two-party system. Of all the hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this
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Duverger accurately described the unique burden on voters, stating
that when more than two candidates or parties run, “electors soon
realize that their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to
the third party,” thus creating a “natural tendency” of voters “to
transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries in order to
prevent the success of the greater evil.”110 In other words, a voter
casts their ballot strategically, in the hopes that their vote will tip
the scales in favor of the least objectionable candidate among the
two most-likely winners.111 Duverger also hypothesized that single-
member districts have a dampening effect on potential third-party
competition due to a feature which distorts representation.112 When
only one individual will represent an entire district, the system
effectively “transform[s] 51% of the votes into 100% of the political
power” in the district.113 Unless a third party can capture upwards
of 33 percent of the vote (which, given the aforementioned tendency
of voters to make strategic, rational choices at the ballot, is highly
unlikely) the two major parties continue to reign supreme.114
Modern scholars agree with Duverger’s assessment of the impact
of single-member districts on voters and the viability of third
parties. In their assessment of “politics as markets,” professors
Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes refer to the single-member
district as “one of the building blocks of the political order” which
“inevitably has the effect of channeling political competition into a
two-party structure.”115 Under a single-member district regime, the
authors claim that voters cast a ballot, “not primarily as a means of
expressing their political values, but as a means of influencing the
choice between the two candidates with the most likely chance of
winning.”116 Professor Richard Hasen has stated that “short of
approaches the most nearly perhaps to a true sociological law.... [The] system appears then
to be capable of maintaining an established dualism in spite of schisms in old parties and the
birth of new parties.”).
110. Id. at 226.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 675-76 n.121 (1998) (paraphrasing Duverger’s
argument).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 674.
116. Id. at 675-76 n.121.
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eliminating winner-take-all elections or single-member districts ...
the United States is likely to continue to be dominated by two major
political parties.”117
While there is broad consensus among scholars that American
voters are handcuffed to two-party dominance due to single-member
districts, there is also strong evidence suggesting voters are yearn-
ing to break free. According to a Gallup poll in September 2017, an
astounding 61 percent of Americans believe that the nation’s
political landscape needs a viable third major party.118 This
dissatisfaction with the two major parties is reflected in party reg-
istration numbers and voter sentiment toward Congress. Of party-
registered voters in 2018, nearly 30 percent were registered as
political independents.119 Furthermore, Congress has failed to break
the 30 percent mark in its approval rating since September 2009,
and has not seen a majority approval rating since 2003, when it
benefited from the national unity associated with the beginning of
the Iraq War.120 Voters’ disdain for members of Congress is not
reserved to the party with a majority of seats, either. Since March
2009, a majority of Gallup poll respondents have expressed disap-
proval with the way both Democratic and Republican members of
Congress have handled their jobs.121
With such stark disapproval of both major parties for much of the
past two decades, one might be shocked to learn that 98.3 percent
of voters in the 2018 midterm elections cast a vote for one of the two
117. Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow
the States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT.
REV. 331, 333.
118. Lydia Saad, Perceived Need for Third Major Party Remains High in U.S., GALLUP
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/219953/perceived-need-third-major-party-
remains-high.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q3MS-2HGL].
119. Rhodes Cook, Registering By Party: Where the Democrats and Republicans Are Ahead,
SABATO’S CRYSTAL BALL (July 12, 2018), http://crystalball.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/
articles/registering-by-party-where-the-democrats-and-republicans-are-ahead/ [https://perma.
cc/8G25-E5PV].
120. Congress and the Public, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.
aspx [https://perma.cc/RUF3-7M2H]; see, e.g., Frank Newport, Seventy-Two Percent of
Americans Support War Against Iraq, GALLUP (Mar. 24, 2003), https://news.gallup.com/
poll/8038/seventytwo-percent-americans-support-war-against-iraq.aspx [https://perma.cc/
8VFM-7S6M] (describing high approval ratings for the president and the war as “an expected
‘rally effect’ increase that usually accompanies U.S. involvement in war or a situation in
which Americans are in harm’s way on foreign shores”).
121. Congress and the Public, supra note 120.
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major parties.122 During the 115th Congress, the U.S. House was
comprised entirely of Republicans and Democrats—all 435 voting
members.123 In fact, only three nonmajor party candidates have
been elected to the U.S. House since 1965.124 However, the disso-
nance between voting patterns and voter sentiment makes sense in
light of Duverger’s widely accepted theory. Voters are smart. They
understand that, despite their disapproval of the two major parties,
the most rational way to exert influence in the voting booth is to
cast their lot with one of the two favorites in the hopes that they will
help tip the scales in favor of the candidate that is least objection-
able.125 To be fair, a great number of voters undoubtedly express
their true preference by voting for one of the major parties. How-
ever, this dissonance between voter sentiment and electoral results
highlights the fact that single-member districts impose a distinctly
hard-to-quantify burden on voters. The system bends voters to its
will, forcing many to make an unenviable choice, and masks the
evidence of its impact with misleading results.126
Given the focus on minor political parties and independent can-
didates in the Court’s development of its political association
jurisprudence to this point,127 one might assume that the group
injured by single-member districts is limited to voting members of
a minor political party struggling for representation. Certainly,
these voters are burdened by single-member districts, but the
nature of the injury in question requires a broader view of the elec-
torate. Just because almost every voter casts a vote each election
cycle for one of the two major parties, one must not mistake their
votes as endorsements. This Note takes the position that there is
an identifiable group of voters injured by Congress’s single-member
district regime, which includes: (1) those who buck the system and
122. Allan Smith, Democrats Won House Popular Vote by Largest Midterm Margin Since
Watergate, NBC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2018, 3:22 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/
democrats-won-house-popular-vote-largest-midterm-margin-watergate-n938996 [https://
perma.cc/82H9-ML9M].
123. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present, HIST., ART &
ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-
Divisions/Party-Divisions/ [https://perma.cc/6DAK-RDEW].
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
127. See supra Part II.A.
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vote outside the major parties and (2) those who make a rational
decision about how to best exert their electoral influence and vote
for one of the major parties, but are deeply unsatisfied with both of
the major-party nominees in a district.
This is an important point, because if the burden in question is
simply characterized as a dearth of representation for minor party
candidates in the U.S. House, plaintiffs will fall short of their mark.
The Supreme Court has clearly articulated that there is no right to
proportional representation for voters who cannot push their
candidate to the finish line.128 Those voters still must “pull, haul,
and trade to find common political ground” with other members in
their voting jurisdiction.129 However, the burden articulated in this
Part goes beyond the representation of minor parties and straight
to the very ideals of voter choice and associational freedom.
In this regard, it helps to keep in mind that the remedy hypothet-
ical plaintiffs would seek is not a district drawn in a manner that
ensures or even favors their selection. Rather, the voters described
above are currently deprived of elections in which a legitimate group
of dissenters from America’s nationalized partisan ideologies can
form a meaningful, viable electoral movement. Congress’s current
single-member district regime, set against the backdrop of the fierce
partisan polarization it has created, forces voters to choose between
two bundles of policy positions with effectively no overlap on most
major issues.130 Certainly, one cannot deny that the vast majority of
voters identify with one major party more than the other. But the
goal of the above discussion of voter sentiment is to argue that these
voters are not nearly as ideologically homogenous as the Democratic
128. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2019) (“Our cases, however,
clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation.”
(quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 130 (1986) (plurality opinion))).
129. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).
130. Congressional voting records indicate that partisans in Congress increasingly vote as
a unit. The Collapse of the Voting Structure—Possible Big Trouble Ahead, VOTEVIEW BLOG
(Jan. 12, 2017), https://voteviewblog.com/2017/01/12/the-collapse-of-the-voting-structure-
possible-big-trouble-ahead/ [https://perma.cc/VM9Z-LF7E] (“[S]ince November 2000 ... Con-
gressional voting [has] collapse[d] into a one dimensional near Parliamentary voting struc-
ture; that is, the parties are very unified.”). “DW-NOMINATE” scores, a means of rep-
resenting legislator voting records ideologically on a spatial map, show that the U.S. House
of Representatives is the most ideologically polarized it has ever been since DW-NOMINATE
scores were tracked starting just before 1880. About the Project, VOTEVIEW, https://voteview.
com/about [https://perma.cc/6T64-HM8X]; Lewis, supra note 39.
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and Republican partisans that represent them. By preserving a
binary, zero-sum politics, single-member districts suppress this
vibrant range of policy views from meaningfully surfacing in our
political discourse, on our ballots, and in the halls of Congress. This
is the associational harm.
In sum, the lack of ideological diversity in the U.S. House is not
in and of itself a violation of voters’ political association rights.131
However, given America’s historic level of political polarization,132
thoroughly diminished electoral competition,133 and deep-seated
voter dissatisfaction,134 the degree to which Democrats and Repub-
licans in Congress are increasingly homogenous and durably
insulated from legitimate third-party competition should serve as
a blaring alarm, signaling that voters’ associational freedoms are
seriously burdened by the status quo.
B. Challenging Congress’s Single-Member District Mandate
Requires Strict Scrutiny
While the Court’s political association jurisprudence requires a
determination as to whether a political association injury is se-
vere enough to merit strict scrutiny, it gives very little guidance
as to what constitutes a severe injury.135 As Professor Tokaji puts
it, the Anderson-Burdick standard “is about as open-ended as legal
standards come.”136 In Williams, the Court focused on the impact
of a petition signature requirement on new political parties and
their supporters.137 In Anderson, the court found Ohio’s early filing
deadline to severely burden “disaffected” voters.138 Yet, in Burdick,
131. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
135. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics:
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 342 (2007) (“What drives the classi-
fication of certain election laws as severely burdensome in kind? ... [T]here is certainly not a
doctrinally settled [answer].”).
136. Tokaji, supra note 52, at 2197.
137. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24-26 (1968).
138. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792 (1983) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23, 33 (1968)).
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Hawaii’s ban on write-in votes was merely “slight.”139 What should
courts make of this limited line of cases in the context of single-
member districts, where voters’ ability to cast a vote outside of the
two major parties is not directly prohibited, but their political
association rights are clearly infringed upon?
Professors Issacharoff and Pildes suggest that courts should
evaluate laws affecting the democratic process through the lens of
politics as a competitive market.140 “Only through an appropriately
competitive partisan environment,” they argue, “can ... the policy
outcomes of the political process be responsive to the interests and
views of citizens.”141 Issacharoff and Pildes advocate that courts
follow the lead of corporate law scholarship, which has shifted from
a focus on the duties of corporate managers to an emphasis on “the
background competitive structures within which managers make
decisions.”142
Correspondingly, they argue that courts considering judicial in-
tervention in the area of election law should shift from a focus on
enforcing individual rights to a closer examination of “the back-
ground structure of partisan competition.”143 In demonstrating this
shift in thinking, Issacharoff and Pildes level heavy criticism of the
Court’s holding in Burdick.144 They argue that the Court in Burdick
mistakenly applied a conventional individual-rights analysis, fo-
cusing on whether the First Amendment protected the right of an
individual voter to cast a protest write-in vote.145 Instead, the Court
should have viewed Hawaii’s write-in ban in the context of the
state Democratic Party’s attempt to insulate itself from political
competition.146 The authors argue that courts evaluating potential
First Amendment violations “ought to focus on whether the process
139. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439 (1992).
140. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 113, at 646 (“The key to our argument is to view
appropriate democratic politics as akin in important respects to a robustly competitive
market—a market whose vitality depends on both clear rules of engagement and on the ritual
cleansing born of competition.”).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 647.
143. Id. at 648.
144. Id. at 672-73.
145. Id. at 672 (“[T]he Court misunderstood Burdick’s claim by applying a narrow, indi-
vidualistic, nonsystemic conception of his claim.”).
146. Id. at 673.
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remains sufficiently open to challenge and reform, or whether the
costs of mobilizing effective challenge have been raised so high as to
leave the system insufficiently responsive.”147
When analyzing the concurring opinions in Vieth and Gill, one is
inclined to believe Justices Kennedy and Kagan took note of the
analogy that Issacharoff and Pildes offer. Departing from the
Court’s focus on individual rights in Burdick, Justice Kennedy took
a broader view in Vieth by recognizing the capacity for partisan
gerrymanders to impinge upon “voters’ representational rights.”148
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence echoed the “politics-as-markets
approach” of Issacharoff and Pildes149 by articulating the danger in
allowing partisans to draw district lines in a manner that “impos[es]
burdens on a disfavored party and its voters,” and stems competi-
tion in the political market.150 In Gill, Justice Kagan took a simi-
larly broad view of the implications that partisan gerrymandering
might have on the political market, expressing concern over district
lines which deprive a party of its “natural political strength,” thus
“weaken[ing] its capacity to perform” basic party functions.151 The
language in these concurring opinions illustrates how prospective
plaintiffs might wield the First Amendment as a tool for restoring
competition to the political market where partisans have attempted
to freeze out their competition—much in the way Issacharoff and
Pildes advocate.152
In a more recent attempt at analogizing a segment of private sec-
tor law to political association jurisprudence, Professor Issacharoff
argues that courts might also look to antitrust law to better
understand how to evaluate restrictions on voting rights.153
Issacharoff expresses concern as to the “[m]issing [p]iece” in
American voting jurisprudence: an inability of courts to grapple
with the fact that partisans themselves run so much of the nation’s
147. Id.
148. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
149. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 113, at 707.
150. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 315 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1938 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring).
152. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 113, at 673.
153. See Samuel Issacharoff, Voter Welfare: An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights
Law, 92 IND. L.J. 299, 324-25 (2016).
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election law and administration.154 In response to this problem, he
points to the manner in which antitrust law has dealt with similar-
ly self-interested capitalists who attempt to stack the deck in their
own favor: a simple guiding principle of consumer welfare.155
Issacharoff argues that courts should use a similar principle “of
voter welfare” when dealing with improper partisan motivation—
“the third rail of electoral challenges.”156 “All the balancing in the
world cannot yield a result if one cannot specify the objective of the
balancing test,” and Issacharoff argues that voter welfare should be
the court’s ultimate objective.157 By applying the Issacharoff and
Pildes theory of “politics as markets” and Issacharoff’s “voter
welfare” model to single-member districts, one can make a strong
case that the burden imposed on voters is best characterized as
“severe,” and that Congress’s mandate, therefore, must receive strict
scrutiny.
C. Weighing Congress’s Legitimate Interest
Upon establishing that a law imposes a severe burden on voters’
political association rights and merits strict scrutiny, a court must
examine the government’s legitimate interest in maintaining its
legislative scheme and conduct a balancing of that interest against
the burden on voters.158 Congress “may not choose a legislative
scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal
liberties,” should “a less drastic” means of achieving its interest
prove readily available.159 In weighing the government’s interest,
the Court also evaluates the degree to which a law actually furthers
the interest it purports to advance.160 The following discussion
measures the effectiveness of Congress’s mandate in achieving its
legitimate interest of ensuring representation of racial minority
154. Id. at 321.
155. Id. at 323-24.
156. Id. at 321, 324.
157. Id. at 323-24.
158. Elmendorf, supra note 135, at 318; see Tokaji, supra note 52, at 2190.
159. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983) (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973)).
160. Id. at 796-99 (finding “no merit in the State’s claim” that Ohio’s early filing deadline
advanced its legitimate interest in “treating all candidates alike”).
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communities in the U.S. House. Upon a finding that single-member
districts ineffectively deliver on this legitimate interest, combined
with an understanding that more effective alternatives are avail-
able to Congress, Part III concludes that single-member districts
cannot be sustained.
The history precipitating Congress’s mandate and subsequent use
of single-member districts as a tool for remedying cases of racial
minority vote dilution does well to demonstrate the key role that
single-member districts currently play in ensuring representation
of racial minority communities in the U.S. House.161 However,
majority-minority single-member districts come with real draw-
backs for the communities of voters they are meant to benefit. One
need not look any further than the standard that the aforemen-
tioned Gingles case set forth to find serious shortcomings of single-
member districts as a standard for remedies under the VRA. In
Gingles, the Court held that in order to bring a successful claim
under section 2 of the VRA, a plaintiff must prove, among other
preconditions, that “the minority group is sufficiently numerous and
compact to form a majority in a single-member district.”162 This
raises a significant hurdle for racial minority groups that, while
numerous, are not compact enough for a single-member district to
be drawn in which those voters comprise a majority.
Moreover, even in districts where racial minority communities are
sufficiently compact to be entitled to representation under the
standard set forth in Gingles, majority-minority districts have
consequences for the effectiveness of such representation. Harvard
Law Professor Lani Guinier has raised serious concerns about the
ability of racial minority communities represented in single-member
districts to influence the legislative process and policy outcomes.163
Guinier, in arguing that single-member districts are an ineffective
means of ensuring representation of racial minorities in legislative
bodies, states that single-member “districting wastes votes because
it forces minorities to concentrate their strength within a few
161. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
162. Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral
Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 333, 344 (1998) (emphasis
added) (citing Gingles v. Thornburg, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986)).
163. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 127-37 (1994).
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electoral districts and thereby isolates them from potential legisla-
tive allies.”164 Due to this inefficiency, Professor Guinier pushes back
against the assumption that becoming a district majority “works as
a proxy for interest.”165 Instead, she notes that creating majority-
minority districts necessarily also requires “creating majority white
districts in which the electoral success of white legislators is not
dependent on black votes. In this way, race-conscious districting
may simply reproduce within the legislature the disadvantaged
numerical and racial isolation that the majority minority district
attempted to cure at the electoral level.”166
Attempts at drawing race-conscious167 single-member districts
face other hurdles as well. In Shaw v. Reno168 and Miller v.
Johnson,169 the Supreme Court further curtailed the effectiveness
of single-member districts as a means of ensuring racial minority
representation. In Shaw, the Court evaluated the constitutionality
of North Carolina’s Twelfth District, “a narrow, oddly shaped
majority-black district.”170 The Court created a new cause of action,
holding that a single-member district was unconstitutional “if it is
so ‘irrational’ as to be understood only as an ‘effort to segregate
voters into separate voting districts because of their race.’”171 The
Court cited the fear that such districts would promote racial ste-
reotypes and “balkanize [voters] into competing racial factions.”172
In Miller, the Court provided a more articulate standard for
measuring such claims, holding that plaintiffs can challenge
districts by showing “that race was the predominant factor” in cre-
ating the district, to the detriment of race-neutral principles such
164. Id. at 135.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Professor Guinier defines the term “race-conscious” in the context of districting as “the
practice of maximizing or consolidating the number of minority group members in a single,
or a few winner-take-all subdistricts.” Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests:
The Question of Single-Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1135 n.2 (1993).
168. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
169. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
170. Mulroy, supra note 162, at 346.
171. Id. at 346-47 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657-58).
172. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657.
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as “compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions
or communities defined by actual shared interests.”173
Despite originally functioning as a limit on the ability of district
mapmakers to maximize racial minority representation, the Shaw
cause of action now predominantly functions as a means for racial
minority voters to combat maps in which racial minority communi-
ties have been tightly packed into suspiciously few districts,
minimizing the voters’ potential electoral success.174 This fact illus-
trates how single-member districts, in the context of today’s age of
precise district mapmaking, can too easily be leveraged to depress
the representation of racial minority communities.175 It also gives
further credence to Professor Guinier’s fear that majority-minority
districts undercut the political leverage of the communities in such
districts.176
Professor Steven J. Mulroy, a former civil rights lawyer for the
U.S. Department of Justice, notes that Shaw and Miller, combined
with the VRA, create “a dilemma for anyone interested in drawing
fair electoral districts. The [VRA] requires that race be taken into
account when drawing districts, but the Shaw cause of action re-
quires that race not be used ‘too much.’”177 The use of alternative
voting methods in multimember districts offers “the way out of this
dilemma” according to Mulroy.178
173. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
174. Jamin B. Raskin, Taking the States’ Congressional Delegations Seriously: A Twelfth
Amendment and First Amendment Approach to Identifying the Worst Gerrymanders, 59 WM.
& MARY L. REV. ONLINE 127, 163 (2018) (“There are not many people motivated to bring Shaw
claims anymore, except African Americans themselves.... [Plaintiffs understand] that their
votes are being traduced and diluted through the cynical ‘packing’ process underway in
redistricting throughout the South.”).
175. See, e.g., Spencer, Hughes & Richie, supra note 13, at 387 (“African-American voters
comprise 29.9% of the vote in Louisiana, 24.7% of the vote in Alabama, and 26.3% of the vote
in South Carolina, yet they have the power to elect only one member (out of six, seven, and
seven seats, respectively) in each state’s sole majority-minority district.” (footnotes omitted)).
176. See GUINIER, supra note 163, at 135. To truly comprehend the ramifications of this
problem, consider the fact that “a majority of the African-American population in every state
with a history of racially polarized voting lives in a majority-white district.” Spencer, Hughes
& Richie, supra note 13, at 387.
177. Mulroy, supra note 162, at 348.
178. Id. at 349.
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To underscore the potential of alternative voting methods, one
need not look any further than the proven track record of alterna-
tive voting methods in at-large or multiwinner district elections to
elect local legislative bodies compiled by Spencer, Hughes &
Richie.179 The authors point to remedies in Alabama, Texas, South
Dakota, Illinois, North Carolina, and New York as “places where
plaintiffs sued local jurisdictions for their use of winner-take-all, at-
large voting, and where the jurisdictions settled by adopting
[proportional] voting methods instead of switching to [single-
member] districts.”180
It is important to stress that this critique of single-member,
majority-minority districts seeks not to diminish or understate their
incredible improvement upon winner-take-all at-large voting
schemes, or the hard-fought success of civil rights leaders181 in
achieving improved representation through a combination of the
VRA and single-member districts. And certainly, without an al-
ternative voting method to winner-take-all elections, any multi-
member or at-large scheme would be unpalatable as a means of fair
representation for all.182 However, more than fifty years of experi-
ence with single-member districts has demonstrated that Congress’s
1967 mandate no longer represents the most effective way to ad-
dress the problem it sought to solve.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that Congress’s single-
member district mandate imposes a severe burden on voters’ po-
litical association rights, and therefore must receive strict scrutiny.
Furthermore, while well-intentioned at its inception, the mandate
poorly serves its original intended purpose in the wake of the VRA.
179. See Spencer, Hughes & Richie, supra note 13, at 395.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 14, at 5 (“On the afternoon of March 7, 1965, [John]
Lewis ... headed over to Brown Chapel, the redbrick headquarters of Selma’s civil rights
movement.... Lewis and six hundred marchers came face-to-face with an army of blue-
helmeted Alabama state troopers when they reached the Edmund Pettus Bridge.... ‘I really
thought I was going to die. I thought it was the last protest.’”).
182. Congress could adopt any number of alternative systems to single-member districts
that would still ensure groups of voters in the minority in any given jurisdiction could earn
their fair share of representation. For example, a bill introduced in the House during the
115th Congress would have states that elect five or fewer representatives to the U.S. House
do away with district lines altogether and elect representatives at-large using ranked choice
voting, a voting method that produces proportional, rather than winner-take-all, results. See
Fair Representation Act, H.R. 3057, 115th Cong. §§ 202-203 (2017).
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In light of these changed circumstances, the burden on voters’ First
Amendment rights must outweigh Congress’s legitimate interest in
mandating single-member districts. With any number of “less
drastic” election schemes available to Congress that would better
ensure representation for all, courts cannot continue to uphold “a
legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental
personal liberties.”183
It is worth noting that in response to a challenge of this nature to
single-member districts, Congress would likely argue the law is also
a means to achieve several other legitimate interests that have been
recognized by the Supreme Court in previous cases decided under
the Anderson-Burdick standard, such as, an interest in maintaining
a two-party system to promote political stability and avoid factional-
ism.184 This Note only addresses the most predominant interest
Congress had in mind when it passed the law in 1967, but the
problems facing American democracy described in Part I begin to
build the case against the notion that single-member districts
promote political stability or avoid factionalism.185
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT JUSTICIABILITY
Despite the evident implications single-member districts have for
voters’ political association rights, opponents of the foregoing con-
stitutional arguments will likely raise the issue of justiciability.
Part IV explores dicta from Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party
indicating the Court’s reticence to consider the constitutionality of
single-member districts due to its political question doctrine,186 and
then rebuts these justiciability concerns in the context of the Court’s
political question jurisprudence.
183. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983) (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973)).
184. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (recognizing pursuit of “political
stability” and avoidance of “unrestrained factionalism” as legitimate state interests).
185. See supra Part I.B.
186. 520 U.S. 351, 362 (1997).
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A. Timmons and the Court’s Reticence to Intervene
The Supreme Court has long been reticent to enter the “political
thicket” and decide cases that hinge on political questions which, in
the Court’s view, ought to be left to the discretion of the political
branches of government.187 In this way, the Court’s political
question doctrine is “essentially a function of the separation of
powers.”188 However, since it “first entered the political thicket in
the early 1960s,” the Court’s “oversight over the political process has
expanded” significantly.189
Despite the Court’s expanding role in this area, there remains a
prevailing view that Congress’s choice of single-member districts is
a policy choice beyond the reach of First Amendment analysis. The
Court, in dicta, seemingly expressed this view in Timmons, a case
in which the Anderson-Burdick standard was applied to a Minne-
sota law banning fusion voting.190
The plaintiffs—a local minor political party—argued that the law
kept the party from building “political alliances and thus broaden-
ing [its] base of ... support for its activities.”191 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed, highlighting minor
party members’ “no-win choice” between “vot[ing] for candidates
with no realistic chance of winning, defect[ing] from their party
and vot[ing] for a major party candidate who does, or declin[ing] to
vote at all.”192
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state’s antifusion
law did “not directly preclude[ ] minor political parties from de-
veloping and organizing.... Nor ha[d] Minnesota excluded a par-
ticular group of citizens, or a political party, from participation in
187. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (expressing the Court’s
hesitancy to decide cases about reapportionment under the political question doctrine, with
Justice Frankfurter writing that “[c]ourts ought not ... enter this political thicket”).
188. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
189. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 113, at 644.
190. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 362. Fusion voting allows “more than one political party [to]
support a common candidate. Consequently, the name of a single candidate can appear on the
same ballot multiple times under multiple party lines.” Fusion Voting, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballot pedia.org/Fusion_voting#cite_note-definition-1 [https://perma.cc/T5W8-FSNK].
191. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 360 (quoting Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d
196, 199 (1996)).
192. McKenna, 73 F.3d at 199.
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the election process.”193 In concluding that the burden imposed on
voters was not severe, the Court likened the antifusion law to
single-member districts, stating that “[m]any features of our
political system—e.g., single-member districts ... make it difficult for
third parties to succeed in American politics.... But the Constitution
does not require States to permit fusion any more than it requires
them to move to proportional-representation elections.”194
In the wake of Timmons, there are differing views as to the
meaning of the foregoing mention of single-member districts. One
possible explanation expressed by Professor Hasen is that the Court
simply did not view single-member districts as burdensome enough
to require heightened scrutiny.195 Hasen postulates that laws favor-
ing the two-party system need only rational basis review, and
therefore “the Court would not need to apply heightened scrutiny to
an argument that the use of single-member districts ... are unconsti-
tutional.”196
Other scholars, however, are inclined to believe the Court’s
mention of single-member districts serves to telegraph its view that
Congress’s single-member district mandate is a political decision
outside the bounds of judicial oversight. Professors Issacharoff and
Pildes seemingly take this view, characterizing single-member
districts as a problematic, yet permanent, feature of the American
political landscape.197 They state “that, for institutional reasons,
courts are hardly likely to declare [single-member] district[ ] elec-
tions and [first-past-the-post voting] unconstitutional,” as they
would likely “find it well beyond their proper role.”198 Issacharoff
and Pildes are critical of the Timmons Court’s analysis as to the
burdensome nature of Minnesota’s antifusion law,199 but agree with
the Timmons Court that single-member districts are off the table.200
193. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 361.
194. See id. at 362.
195. See Hasen, supra note 117, at 344 n.77.
196. Id.
197. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 113, at 679.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 685 (“In contrast to the way the ... Court approached Timmons, under a political
markets analysis of electoral regulation, the antifusion laws should trigger exacting judicial
scrutiny.”).
200. Id. at 679.
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Other scholars concur with this view. In an article responding to
the Issacharoff and Pildes theory of politics as markets, David
Schliecher argues that the American political market should be
treated in the same way economic regulations treat natural
duopolies.201 He argues that the Court in Timmons viewed Ameri-
can politics through this lens and ruled accordingly,202 despite the
fact that “it is relatively clear that our single-member district/[first-
past-the-post] system imposes a severe burden on the extent to
which elected officials are representative[s] of voters’ preferences.”203
In fact, Schliecher argues that when one applies Issacharoff and
Pildes’s theory of political competition, “it is impossible to ... main-
tain [first-past-the-post] elections” in single-member districts.204 A
similar scholarly view suggests that single-member districts fall
into a category of “substantially burdensome regulations that are
not subject to strict scrutiny.”205 To submit these laws to strict
scrutiny would be to “call[ ] into question the long-accepted struc-
ture of the American [political] system.”206
Each of these three interpretations of the Court’s dicta in
Timmons alludes to the fact that single-member districts must
survive a constitutional challenge, but not on the merits of a First
Amendment inquiry. There is general agreement among these views
that single-member districts impose a severe burden on voters’
political association rights,207 but also consensus that a faithful
application of the Court’s political association jurisprudence to
Congress’s long-standing single-member district mandate is beyond
201. David Schleicher, “Politics as Markets” Reconsidered: Natural Monopolies, Competitive
Democratic Philosophy and Primary Ballot Access in American Elections, 14 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 163, 192 (2006).
202. Id. at 197-98 (“If the American electoral system is a natural duopoly, then consti-
tutional review of electoral regulation of parties should permit rules that favor the existence
of a two-party system, because creating barriers to entry for small third parties makes it more
likely that the winner of an election will be the choice of the majority.”).
203. Id. at 191.
204. Id.
205. The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 309, 314 (1997).
206. Id. at 316.
207. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 113, at 674 (“[S]ingle-member district[s] inevitably
[have] the effect of channeling political competition into a two-party structure.”); see supra
notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
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the proper role of the Court.208 The common thread, it seems, is an
acknowledgement of the Court’s political question doctrine and
doubt as to the justiciability of a challenge to single-member
districts.
B. Rebutting Justiciability Concerns
The Timmons Court’s mention of single-member districts is only
dicta, and thus is not binding law.209 However, in light of the
prevailing view that a constitutional challenge to single-member
districts may not be justiciable, it is worth very briefly examining
the Court’s “political question” jurisprudence to properly rebut such
an argument.
In Baker v. Carr, a landmark case in developing the Court’s
political question doctrine, the Court overturned a district court’s
ruling that the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Ten-
nessee’s reapportionment laws was nonjusticiable.210 The district
court based its decision on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Colegrove
v. Green, in which a plurality of Justices held that a challenge to
Illinois’s reapportionment of legislative districts was a political
question beyond the bounds of the Court’s proper role.211
In reversing the district court in Baker, the Supreme Court
drastically narrowed its holding in Colegrove, and gave some
guidance as to what constitutes a nonjusticiable political question.212
The Court stated that, based on its political question doctrine
jurisprudence, there were six circumstances—none of which were
present in the apportionment case before it—in which a political
208. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 113, at 679 (“[F]or institutional reasons,
courts are hardly likely to declare districted elections and [first-past-the-post] unconsti-
tutional.”).
209. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 362 (1997) (finding that
Minnesota’s fusion ban did not impose a severe burden on New Party’s associational rights,
and holding the law to be constitutional).
210. 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (“[T]his cause presents no nonjusticiable ‘political question.’”).
211. 328 U.S. 549, 550, 556 (1946) (“To sustain this action would cut very deep into the very
being of Congress. Courts ought not to enter this political thicket.”).
212. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209-10 (“The District Court misinterpreted Colegrove v. Green....
Appellants' claim that they are being denied equal protection is justiciable, and ... ‘the right
to relief ... is not diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights.’”
(quoting Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944))).
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question might preclude the Court’s involvement: (1) there is “a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department;” (2) the Court lacks a “judicially
discoverable and manageable standard[ ] for resolving” the question;
(3) circumstances exist which make it impossible for the Court to
decide the case “without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion;” (4) the Court cannot decide the
case “without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government;” (5) there is “an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made;” or (6) there is “po-
tential[ ] of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.”213 This Part will conclude by
addressing the first, third, and fourth of these potentially thorny
“political thickets” as they relate to Congress’s single-member
district mandate.214
The first guiding principle from Baker is that when the text of the
Constitution commits an issue to another branch of government, it
may indicate that judicial oversight of the issue is impermissible.215
When it comes to regulating democracy, the Constitution explicitly
grants Congress the power to regulate the time, place, and manner
of elections for the U.S. Senate and House.216 However, just because
Congress’s single-member district mandate flows from a constitu-
tionally enumerated power does not mean that the law is immune
from the limits of the Constitution.217 The Court demonstrated as
much regarding the aforementioned Elections Clause in Shelby
County v. Holder, when it struck down section 4(b) of the VRA
because it infringed upon the constitutional sovereignty of the
213. Id. at 217.
214. As Part II demonstrates, the Anderson-Burdick test constitutes a judicially accepted
standard for dealing with alleged violations of voters’ political association rights. See supra
Part II. Furthermore, the fifth and sixth concerns raised by the Baker Court are not of
particular concern should the Court be asked to rule on the constitutionality of Congress’s
single-member district mandate.
215. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993); Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
217. See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012) (“[W]hen an Act of Congress is
alleged to conflict with the Constitution, ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177
(1803))).
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states.218 Congress’s single-member district mandate is no different:
just because the Constitution empowers Congress to regulate
federal elections does not mean such laws are exempt from constitu-
tional review.219
The third and fourth concerns raised by the Baker Court are
similar, and taken together in the context of challenging Congress’s
single-member district mandate, they can best be summarized as
prohibiting the Court from usurping Congress’s legislative power.220
By ruling on the constitutionality of single-member districts, the
Court would not prescribe any preferred election system for U.S.
House elections, nor decide which theory of political representation
Congress should adopt, as members of the Court have cautioned
against.221 Instead, the Court would simply decide if one specific
method of representation (single-member districts) comports with
voters’ political association rights under the First Amendment.222
Moreover, the Court would not be “reallocat[ing] political power
between the two major political parties, with no ... legal standards
to limit and direct their decision[ ].”223 By striking down Congress’s
mandate, the Courts would not in theory or in practice take seats
from any one party or give them to another; it would choose no
winners or losers.
This Note’s argument is also notably different than the line-
drawing requested by the plaintiffs in Rucho, in which the Court
balked at the prospect of answering the question: “How much is too
218. 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). It is worth noting that while Shelby County does well to
illustrate the fact that laws passed by Congress pursuant to the Elections Clause are still
subject to constitutional review, this author subscribes to Justice Ginsburg’s view that the
majority’s decision was tantamount to “throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because
you are not getting wet.” Id. at 590 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 557 (majority opinion).
220. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
221. See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (expressing his concern that the Court’s vote dilution jurisprudence had “immersed
the federal courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory”); Baker, 369
U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“What is actually asked of the Court in this case is
to choose among competing bases of representation—ultimately, really, among competing
theories of political philosophy.”).
222. See supra Part II.B.
223. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019). As explained earlier, the Court
can turn to the Anderson-Burdick standard for a well-developed frame of analysis for
evaluating burdens on political association rights. See supra Part II.A.
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much [partisanship in redistricting]?”224 If one views election
systems on a spectrum of most burdensome to least burdensome,
this Note argues that single-member districts represent the “most
burdensome” endpoint of the spectrum.225 Indeed, one cannot pos-
sibly elect less than a single member to the U.S. House in a district.
By striking down Congress’s chosen method of representation in the
U.S. House, the Court would not dictate that Congress instead
adopt the “least burdensome” endpoint on the spectrum (i.e., the
most granular version of proportional representation one can
imagine).226 Rather, with the “most burdensome” point on the
spectrum of systems of representation spoken for by the Court,
Congress would then have an opportunity to weigh any number of
alternatives that better achieve its legitimate interests in having a
national standard for U.S. House elections.227
Shelby County represents a modern example of the Court taking
this approach. In Shelby County, the Court found that circum-
stances had changed so much since the VRA was enacted in 1965
that the law’s preclearance formula was no longer constitutional.228
By striking down the provision, the Court did not mandate a
legislative path forward, nor preclude Congress from passing an
updated preclearance formula.229 Rather, upon finding that a statute
violated the Constitution, the Court struck it down, allowing
Congress to pass any number of alternatives to the unconstitutional
version on the books.230 Should the Court strike down Congress’s
single-member district mandate, it would similarly force Congress
to adopt a new system that “speaks to current conditions,”231 while
224. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2501.
225. Schleicher, supra note 201, at 191 (“[I]t is relatively clear that our single-member
district/[first-past-the-post] system imposes a severe burden on the extent to which elected
officials are representative of voters’ preferences.”); see supra Part III.
226. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 338 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The
Constitution does not, of course, require proportional representation of racial, ethnic, or
political groups.”).
227. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
228. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (expressing the fact that
America had changed since 1965, and that Congress must ensure that its legislation “speaks
to current conditions”).
229. See id. (“Congress may draft another formula based on current conditions.”).
230. See id.
231. Id.
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refraining from dictating to Congress how that system must
function.
It is also worth noting that Congress’s single-member district
mandate lies partly in the hands of a U.S. House full of self-
interested partisans belonging to the two major parties.232 Drawing
upon Professor Issacharoff’s aforementioned “voter welfare” model
as a means to combat self-interested partisans in charge of election
rules, it is hard to imagine an election law in more serious need of
court intervention than single-member districts.233
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is,”234 and when presented with a statute
that violates the Constitution, the Court cannot avoid its duty
“merely ‘because the issues have political implications.’”235 Should
the Court be presented with a constitutional challenge to Con-
gress’s single-member district mandate, it can and must fulfill its
duty to rule on the merits.
CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted its single-member district mandate for
U.S. House elections in 1967, the law was a simple means to a well-
intentioned end.236 However, fifty years of experience using single-
member districts to elect the U.S. House has illustrated the serious
consequences Congress’s chosen election system has had on
American politics.237 Furthermore, modern analysis reveals that the
law poorly delivers on its original goal,238 while severely stifling
voters’ political association rights and precluding any hope of robust
competition in our national marketplace of ideas.239
With hopes dashed that the Court would step in to directly
address partisan gerrymandering, it is time for democracy advocates
232. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
233. See Issacharoff, supra note 153, at 322-24.
234. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 177 (1803)).
235. Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983)).
236. See supra Part I.A.
237. See supra Part I.B.
238. See supra Part III.C.
239. See supra Part III.
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to think—quite literally—outside the single-member district box.
The best path out of the nation’s districting quandary is moving
beyond its current single-member district paradigm altogether, and
the most compelling First Amendment challenge plaintiffs can bring
is against Congress’s mandate of districts themselves. Now is the
time to challenge America’s outdated means of electing the “People’s
House,” and usher in a responsive electoral system to reinvigorate
the nation’s politics.
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